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A
t the Federal Reserve’s September conference in Washington, D.C., one partici-
pant remarked, “There are lakes of capital and lakes of need.” How to channel 
one to the other was the central question we wrestled with at the two-day confer-
ence. This article attempts to capture the major themes and ideas from those 
discussions. It starts with an overview, then explores why community development finance 
needs to evolve, and concludes with strategies to achieve next steps.
Although the conference did not uncover any “silver bullets,” the conferees explored a 
multi-faceted framework for connecting community development to the capital markets: 
community development lenders need to better understand different investors and their 
different appetites for risk; investors need more, and better, data on community development 
assets; and lenders and investors need a new platform for exchanging this information.
Many conferees agreed that data was the key to progress. Going forward, we need to mine 
existing data, generate new programs to gather it, and find proxies and other stand-ins for the 
data we do not have in the ongoing effort to transform community development investing 
from an uncertain proposition to one with known risk parameters for investors. Robert Van 
Order made one of the most important observations during the two-day event: “Risk is 
where you know the probabilities, like roulette. It may be very risky, the chances of winning 
may be very small and the payoff is very big, but you can evaluate that.” Uncertainty, on the 
other hand, is when “you don’t know the probabilities.” When you know the risk, you can 
realistically price the asset, but under conditions of uncertainty, investors assume the worst 
and will either forgo an investment or demand exorbitant insurance.
Other  important  themes  from  the  conference—problems  with  the  portfolio  lending 
model, a desire to expand, and the need to leverage existing subsidies and other resources— 
are summarized in this article and expounded upon in other essays in this Review. Many of 
the observations help us better understand the current state of affairs, but there were also 
many ideas on new financial technology, new approaches to public policy, and new ways to 
organize this market in order to “connect the lakes.”
I. Overview
Robert Van Order, the former chief economist at Freddie Mac and a University of Mich-
igan economics professor, kicked off the conference with a presentation based on his article 
in the last issue of the Community Development Investment Review (summarized below). The 
presentation proposed three questions: (1) what are the basic ways to raise capital? (2) what 
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advantages are there to one over another? and (3) what special burdens do community devel-
opment lenders face in this framework? On the first issue, Van Order, borrowing from the 
work of the economist John Hicks, said: “There are two typical ways of thinking about raising 
money; one is the bank route and the other is the capital markets or bond route.”
Bank vs Bond Model
In the traditional sense, banks “originate and hold loans and raise money in the deposit 
market.” All aspects of the lending process are centered in the bank—“originating the loans, 
collecting the money, managing the credit risk.” 
The second model is securitization, “which is really the bond market or the financial 
markets.”  In  an  effort  to  clarify  the  terminology,  Van  Order  explained  that  ”secondary 
market” is a term that means “the second place that the pieces of paper go.” He said, “It’s 
a little bit similar to how Aristotle talked about metaphysics, but that just meant it was the 
chapter of the book that came after the book on physics.” He continued, “It’s the securitiza-
tion that is interesting, the turning of these instruments, these loans of various sorts, into 
securities that can go to the bond market.”
A significant difference between the bank model and the bond model is the latter’s divi-
sion of labor. Van Order used single-family mortgages as an example.
Right now in the mortgage business, about half of the loans go through mort-
gage brokers who have no stake in [the entire process] other than getting the 
deal done. Servicing is done by separate people. Raising the money may be 
entirely in the bond market, and taking the risk might be assumed by an insurer 
or a third party. The problem is, of course, that when you do this and you have 
something like a food chain, you’re at risk if the people ahead of you in line 
don’t do a good job. So this division of labor is a neat thing. It’s in securitiza-
tion, but it involves some costs. 
The division of labor provides opportunities for specialization, but it also creates prin-
cipal-agent problems and transaction costs. In addition, this approach creates problems 
around information, as John Quigley, an economist from UC Berkeley, commented, “You 
probably have a lemons problem,” referring to the economist George Akerlof’s concept of 
making decisions under conditions of asymmetry of information.
The most attractive aspect of the bond model, however, is that lenders can access tremen-
dous amounts of capital: “You have a neat machine for raising money in the bond market,” 
according to Van Order. However, “you have a problem with getting bond market investors 
to be interested in things they don’t know much about. So the question is, how do you 
balance those two things?”
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The Example of the Mortgage Market
An illustrative example of an asset class that was once funded through the bank model 
but evolved to the bond model is the case of single-family home mortgages. 
Van Order observed that the evolution to the bond model for mortgages also triggered a 
division of labor and created an information problem. “When you buy things second, you’re 
buying them from someone who knew them first and probably knows more than you do. An 
awful lot of what went on in the evolution of the mortgage market and the development of 
the secondary market had to do with trying to overcome that problem.” 
The first efforts to overcome principal-agent problems involved contracts and down 
payments. But in time, what gave investors comfort was that they could know the risks by 
using abundant and good data. “Without [good data], you’re at risk of people who make the 
loans keeping the good ones and selling you the bad ones.” Van Order notes that “under-
standing credit history and having a big database” gives investors some comfort that they are 
making good risk-return estimates.
Another advantage was the quality of the collateral. “The great thing about the American 
system is that you can bounce people out of their houses if they don’t make the payments,” 
according to Van Order. “Now that may sound cruel, and sometimes when I do this presenta-
tion in international groups, I’ll put something up on the board that says if you want people 
to have good housing, you have to be able to take it away from them.” Foreclosure is rare, 
he notes, “between one and two percent over the life of the loan.” Because foreclosure is an 
option, homeowners can borrow at very low rates over a long term.
The Mortgage Market: Lessons for Community Development?
Can community development loans be compared to the mortgage model? It may be 
a stretch, according to Van Order. Consider the following characterization of community 
development loans:
They’re very different. They’re very heterogeneous. You don’t always have good 
information about the characteristics of the business or the borrower. They 
tend to be small in scale, so that some of the advantages of getting to the bond 
market are missing. They’re servicing-intensive. By that I mean, you have to 
keep track of the borrowers. And the loans may have to be sold at a discount. 
The latter, I don’t think is all that interesting. The fact you sold at a discount 
means they’re worth less than market. They’re worth less whether or not you 
hold them. But particularly the first four [characteristics listed above] are things 
that make securitization less likely to happen, and they’re all things that make 
it hard for bond market investors. 
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Two Securitization Models
The bond model has two basic types: (1) the standard model, where the transaction is 
set up like a mutual fund; and (2) the David Bowie model, which operates more like corpo-
rate bonds (with credit enhancement built into the transaction). “In terms of securitization 
models, I want to think again of two polar cases. One is the pass-through, the mortgage-
backed security model, which is basically a pool of loans,” according to Van Order.
In the case of secondary mortgage markets, Fannie, Freddie, or Ginnie, those 
are credit enhancements, but much of the risk—in particular, payment risk—is 
passed straight through to the investors. Maybe it’s carved up, which is one of 
the interesting things. 
The advantage of the straight pass-through in the way that Fannie and Freddie 
do it is that it is relatively homogeneous. You can call up a broker and say you 
want to buy a Fannie Mae thirty-year fixed rate and the broker will deliver one. 
You don’t have to worry too much about whether they’re giving you a really 
bad one because they’re pretty homogeneous, and you don’t have to worry 
about the credit risk. 
The second example is the David Bowie model, where the British rock star sold his future 
revenue stream from his music royalties to investors.
[David Bowie] sold ten-year debt secured by the royalty stream and it was a 
securitization. They sold the bonds. They were ten-year bonds. They had a 
rating. The bonds actually got downgraded a few years after because of Napster, 
right? But they were there, and while it was a securitization, it wasn’t quite the 
same as the pass-throughs because it was set up as a corporation, where the 
assets and the cash flows that came in were from these receipts, and there was 
a liability, the ten-year bonds, and Bowie kept a residual. You can think of it as 
two classes, but he was essentially the shareholder. He had limited liability. The 
idea was at the end of ten years he’d refinance. He raised $55 million.
It appears that the David Bowie royalties securitization model had similarities with the 
community development loan market.
He had an asset that was very heterogeneous that the market didn’t much 
know about, but he had an equity cushion, which you can think of as taking 
a subordinated position. The market would handle the debt because of the 
equity cushion. So, this structure could get a bond-market rating, AA, AAA, 
something like that, and the institutional and traditional bond market investors 
could handle this. You could sell everything off. The deal was self-contained. 
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Which One Is Better? Does It Matter?
“Does rearranging those cash flows in some fancy way add value? And the answer is that 
in this particular situation with perfect markets, people understanding the risks, it doesn’t.” 
Drawing on the Modigliani-Miller theorem, Van Order said that the financing structure 
should be irrelevant. He illustrated this idea with a simple metaphor about someone ordering 
a pizza. The person behind the counter says, “You want this in six slices or eight slices?” The 
response is: “Why don’t you cut it into eight slices. I feel hungry tonight.” 
But markets are not perfect and information is incomplete. “What is it, if you’re proposing 
a structure—a securitization structure, a bank structure, Bowie bonds, messy CMOs—what is 
it about carving up the cash flows in this particular way that gives you an advantage over 
some other way?” In other words, how does the structure of the transaction add value? John 
Quigley suggested that a Bowie-style securitization might have several advantages:
First, there may be external benefits to certain kinds of lending. The benefits 
might  arise  from  geographical  concentrations,  providing  external  effects  in 
particular areas, or there might be benefits from risk pooling, for example, in 
providing loans to similarly situated mobile home owners across geographical 
areas. 
In addition to helping to manage risk, securitization also allows lenders to carve up the 
asset into risk tranches and sell off each layer to the most appropriate and motivated buyer. 
Lenders can create discrete investment products that might match the appetite for specific 
investors. Van Order compared this to cutting up chickens; you can sell the whole chicken, 
but you might get a better price if you sell breasts to the people who want to buy only breasts 
and thighs to those who only want to buy thighs. 
II. Why Evolve?
The for-profit marketplace for certain loan products has changed dramatically. John 
Quigley said, “The success of mortgage lenders in basically changing from a bunch of unre-
lated institutions that make loans, service loans, and then put them in the basement some-
where, to a set of institutions that originate loans that are then serviced by specialists and sold 
in world capital markets is really a spectacular change.”
Betsy  Zeidman,  of  the  Milken  Institute,  however,  reminded  the  conferees  that  the 
community development finance industry may not be prepared for such a radical transfor-
mation. Many CDFIs and other community lenders are not experiencing a liquidity crisis, 
or feeling an urgent need to access the capital markets. She mentioned that her group had 
completed a research project in the San Francisco Bay Area on CDFIs and banks lending to 
the Latino community. Her finding was that many of the groups did not want to securitize 
any of their loans. Many respondents to her study said, “We don’t need the capital. We 
don’t have a liquidity problem.” She pushed many of them, asking why they were not more 
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aggressive and lending more and the responses were, “We don’t see enough deal flow” and 
“It’s too expensive.”
While there were some discussions at the conference about how feasible and reasonable 
it would be to aggressively pursue new capital market strategies for community development, 
most conferees felt strongly that there was a need to evolve, based in part by the drive to 
expand their community development mission and to use subsidies more efficiently—to get 
the maximum bang for the buck.
Bob Schall, president of Self-Help Ventures Fund, said, “We’ve been portfolio lenders for 
many years, but we’re facing barriers on how to keep financing”:
•  On the portfolio model, we’re constrained by a lack of equity and can borrow only 
so much debt with restricted equity, so that’s a good reason to sell.
•  Another reason is that the source of debt is primarily from banks and is generally 
more expensive than the bond or repo market, so it’s the shortest route to better-
priced debt.
•  Also, [community development] assets are often long-term and we’re trying to match 
it on the liability side. Bank debt is often not the best source for this match.
“In reality,” Schall continued, “we’re being pushed into securitization because of a lack 
of success on the portfolio side.”
It was surprising to hear that even some of the world’s largest financial institutions were 
feeling “pushed into securitization.” Dan Letendre of Merrill Lynch suggested that he was 
also concerned with constraints. 
And so, while $70 billion is a relatively large balance sheet, when we operate as 
a $1 trillion institution with only 5 percent on the balance sheet, I have to tell 
you, we feel every day—and I feel every day—capital constrained and the balance 
sheet is a high priority.
Letendre said that deciding to move into the capital markets is not easy; hard and painful 
decisions must be made about how to change the way a community lender does business 
before it can sell loans into the secondary market. [See Doug Winn’s article on this topic 
later in the Review.]
Before you have to do it, it’s only a demonstration, and you don’t make the 
hard choices until you’re required to do it. But the best and the brightest and 
the biggest CDFIs, and the fastest growing, are getting to that place.
In large measure, the drive to evolve is the ambition to do more. CDFIs and community 
lenders are aggressive in their efforts to serve their communities, and the growth of some of 
the leading CDFIs has been staggering. Consider the example of the Low Income Invest-
ment Fund (LIIF). Nancy Andrews, president and CEO of LIIF, said, “The year that I joined 
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[1998], we thought that we were doing a fairly high volume of business and we made a total 
of $7 million of loans in three markets. And I remember my staff was complaining about 
being overworked. My Southern California office made a sum total of $2 million in loans 
that year and had two loan officers to do that. The year 2006 for us just concluded on June 
30, and for the second year in a row, we’ve done close to $100 million of loans. We are plan-
ning on $120 million of loans next year.” The rapid change made Andrews remark that the 
industry is now on a cusp, “some say, an inflection point.”
Frank Altman, president of CRF, echoed the sentiment that community development had 
made dramatic progress. Twenty-five years ago the industry did not exist and only 10 to 15 
years ago did community development financial institutions start to build up their lending 
and investment efforts: “Only over time have organizations kind of working in isolation at a 
very small scale in communities been able to tap the depository market by getting banks to 
come into their efforts, or the philanthropic marketplace by developing a mechanism to use 
program related investments from foundations or the quasi equity using something called 
equity equivalent investments that a number of banks have pioneered.”
Many conferees agreed that the next step for many organizations in community develop-
ment finance was to employ both bank and bond models. Playing off Van Order’s compar-
ison of bank and bond models, Bob Schall suggested that the group think of that comparison 
not as an either/or proposition, but as using both approaches; in other words, touting the 
bank and bond model. “I don’t think we should just look at securitization but rather look at 
improving the portfolio model because it is best for CDFIs to have both options.” Securiti-
zation could help both for selling assets and for managing a CDFI’s portfolio. For example, 
the “MBSs [mortgage-backed securities] that have been created have been very helpful in 
attracting debt. By holding MBS on balance sheet, they also are a great source of collateral 
for the repo market.” He concluded, “We’re able to attract credit from the repo market at 
much better rates.”
Others agreed that the bank and bond models are fruitful ways to think about strategies 
for how securitization could help community lenders expand their work. Dan Letendre, for 
example, supported this approach, saying that Merrill Lynch had to employ bank and bond 
models as well:
I think just to reiterate what you’ve heard before, it’s not about just being a 
portfolio lender or just being someone who originates and sells, but rather 
you’re going to be both, like banks are today. In my view, large banks, trillion-
dollar institutions, are beginning to say, “I cannot book and hold all the mort-
gage volume that I have, my balance sheet isn’t big enough, but I’ll originate 
stuff that I can sell and I’ll originate some things that I hold.” If that’s true for a 
trillion-dollar institution, I’m sure it’s going to be true for community develop-
ment loan funds as well. 
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Leverage
An important aspect of strategies to grow is using equity to leverage debt. Andrews said 
that going forward “we will leverage our balance sheets much more than we will grow our 
balance sheets. We will use the balance sheet as a tool, not as an end in itself, but as a tool to 
accomplish the larger goal of our mission”:
So, while I don’t know what the future will really look like, what I can easily 
imagine is taking the Low Income Investment Fund’s $100 million balance 
sheet and leveraging that into a billion-dollar book of business or a billion-
dollar company that is servicing a very, very large portfolio.
Thomas  Bledsoe,  president  of  the  Housing  Partnership  Network  (HPN),  has  been 
pioneering new ways to leverage funds by coordinating his many members’ capital, exper-
tise, and influence. “I think smart use of subsidy is a key for our industry, to figure out how 
to do that, and it means leveraging the different types of social investors who are around this 
room and elsewhere.” 
For example, building on a $2 million earmark in the federal budget, HPN started its own 
insurance company: 
We put $2 million of federal dollars into creating a $30 million fund, which 
has, in turn, done about $500 million worth of leverage. So, you know, it’s a 
high-leverage model, but we will use some core equity that typically comes 
from earmarks from the federal government. 
So we have basically taken some public dollars, put on top of that foundation 
dollars, put on top of that CRA-type investments, and that becomes equity, 
effectively, to leverage senior debt. 
Leverage is not always easy to come by, however, particularly when deal participants 
insist on a high amount of reserves or other padding such as overcollateralization in the deal. 
Annie Donovan from NCB Capital Impact said, “We have been active in the community 
facilities market, and in charter schools and in health care in particular. We have put together 
funds where we have taken in—mostly from government sources—first-loss capital and we use 
that as a reserve, a first-loss reserve. We use our own balance sheet, and we have a partner-
ship with TRF [The Reinvestment Fund]. The first fund we did was in partnership with them 
where the first loss sits in a bank. We put in our own subordinate capital in front of the senior 
capital, and that’s been very successful in leveraging senior capital.” The problem, she said, 
was that sometimes the investors do not understand the asset class and require inordinate 
amounts of reserves.
According to Frank Altman, leveraging is a necessary strategy for using scarce public 
subsidy in the most efficient ways possible. But it is important to remember that leverage is 
usually possible only when there is subsidy in the transaction. “It’s not whether you choose 
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the portfolio model or the securitization model; we’re indifferent,” he said. “It’s about how 
we attract market-rate capital to a nonmarket system. And it’s a system that’s been highly 
dependent on federal appropriations and subsidy.”
Smart use of subsidy helps in lobbying efforts to make the case to legislators that scarce 
government resources are used wisely. An important part of using subsidy is to make sure 
that the industry as a whole is using each subsidy dollar where it can most benefit low-
income communities. On this point, Altman said:
Maybe as a group we need to think about this “X” dollars of subsidy that’s 
going to be available. If we’re going to go with the GSE route, or if we’re trying 
to get federal appropriations, we need to figure out where we want to try to get 
the biggest bang for the buck for the subsidy because everyone’s trying to get 
two million for child care and three million for something else. I don’t know if 
that’s necessarily efficient and if that helps everyone.
This is bigger than any one of us, and we’re trying to think about the industry.
III. Strategies for Getting There
Nancy Andrews of LIIF started a brainstorming session with a pep talk:
[People say] this stuff is just so new and it’s heterogeneous, and it’s small, 
and it’s got all of these obstacles, and there’s really no way to pull this off 
because the obstacles are so great, and if you could pull it off somebody already 
would’ve pulled it off because there are plenty of smart capitalists that could 
do this. But the truth is that if you look at the history, you look at the last 25 
years of the community development movement and you see what we’ve done, 
what I’m here to say is that you all who have really put this all together, you’re 
strong enough, you’re smart enough, you’re definitely good-looking enough to 
make it all happen. 
Many at the conference agreed that a first step in accessing capital markets is to better 
understand who investors are and what types of investments they want. Dan Letendre started 
educating the group on how different investors are motivated by different goals. A particu-
larly helpful insight was his typology of community development investors. [See an article 
on this theme by Ellen Seidman later in this issue of the Review.] “Every investor has a 
different set of preferences that they are trying to reach when they’re interested in either 
lending to you or buying pools of loans, and while every single investor is unique, I like to 
think of them, if there’s a segmentation, in at least three classes of investors: there are CRA 
volume shoppers, there are innovators, and there are yield shoppers.”
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1.  CRA Volume Shoppers
Under  the  Community  Reinvestment  Act,  banks  are  evaluated  based  on 
community development loans and community development investments, and 
those institutions that have less than what they’re looking for are interested in 
quickly increasing the volume of CRA qualifying loans. CRA volume shoppers 
are looking for short-term instruments, preferably one-year loans, loans that we 
either pay off or renew next year, because, as you know, under the CRA test it’s 
about loan originations, not how much we hold. 
CRA volume shoppers want to have new product on an annual basis. They look for 
low-risk investments that are relatively easy to understand. They are not as yield-sensitive as 
other investors. David Leopold of Bank of America echoed this sentiment—that any conver-
sation about how to pull this market along should focus to some degree on Community 
Reinvestment Act considerations. “So my point is that as we discuss this,” Leopold said, “it 
is important to keep in mind how to maximize the regulatory benefit for investors who have 
regulatory goals and to minimize the regulatory constraints for investors who are likely to 
have those regulatory constraints.”
2.  Innovators
Innovators are generally interested in showing the regulators, the press, and 
other organizations that they are extremely innovative. Usually, they have satis-
fied their volume concerns and are interested more in showing that they’re not 
only innovative but also are complex and creative. Usually these investors are 
interested in smaller dollar volume, nonstandard transactions, and they’re also 
not high-yield demanders. But you can’t count on them for a lot of volume. 
Sometimes they take more risk, but you can’t count on them for volume. 
3.  Yield Shoppers
Yield shoppers are more interested in making sure that they can use volume to 
build a profitable lending business. So they’re most interested in rate, fees, and 
usage, because you don’t want to have a $20 million revolving credit facility 
with only $5 million of it used because I’m only earning on the $5 million. By 
the way, the CRA volume shoppers don’t care about that. They get credit for 
the full amount of the revolving credit facility, used or unused. But the yield 
shoppers care about usage and are interested in a longer term. The yield shopper 
doesn’t want to spend forever putting together a facility and then have it pay off 
in a year or two; they’re interested in growing the volume of the business. 
Creating Product that Investors Want
The flip side of knowing investors better is that community development lenders are 
better able to provide them with the product they are looking for. In other words, community 
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development lenders need to understand the investing community better and to start creating 
investment vehicles and products that fit the needs of investors. Dan Letendre continued:
I raise those issues because I believe that the future is in converting—having 
CDFIs convert the loans that they are originating into securities or investments 
in the form that investors are looking for, and splitting up your loans into 
pieces that investors are looking for. You are lending on a fixed-rate basis and 
your investors are interested in floating rates, so it’s important to convert that 
for them. And some investors are interested in senior or subordinated or very 
subordinated pieces, so convert your loans into what investors are looking for. I 
have investors interested in two-year pieces of paper, but my loans have prepay-
ment or extension. You can combine a couple of investors that have different 
appetites to solve that type of a problem. 
As much as lenders can rearrange cash flows and engage in all types of sophisticated 
financial engineering, Letendre reminded the audience that “there’s no way you can finan-
cially engineer a low-rate asset into a high-yield investment if someone isn’t giving you an 
awful lot of subsidy.”
Frank Altman agreed that carving up investments makes sense, but that doing so can be 
expensive and requires a lot of subsidy. Referring to CRF’s two rated securities (CRF-17 and 
CRF-18), Altman said, “We’re using a senior subordinated structure, but the issue becomes 
how much credit enhancement is necessary to get those senior pieces rated. So, credit 
enhancement ultimately in our case is raw credit enhancement. We don’t have a federal 
guarantee. We don’t have an insurance company that can wrap the security. We’re working 
on those elements for the industry, but they’re not there yet.”
Overcoming the Data Hurdle
One of the repeated frustrations among community development lenders is that their 
assets perform well (loan losses are rare) but are priced as though they are risky. As Annie 
Donovan asked, how can we “get closer to true capital markets pricing for the credit enhance-
ment that is being put in those deals? We believe we have something tantamount to a ‘AA’ risk 
and we’re not necessarily getting ‘AA’ pricing right now.” Nancy Andrews also commented 
on this point: “We’ve done something on the order of half a billion dollars of lending in 20 
years and we’ve lost $190,000. So, you get some kind of sense of the underlying quality of 
the credits.” 
The costs of getting investors comfortable in the absence of data are high. Donovan said, 
“We do a lot of community facilities lending, so in the educational field or in the health-care 
field, if we want to securitize, then we’re going to have to be prepared to buy back initially 
very big pieces.” Buying back big pieces—in other words, holding on to a large portion of the 
security because nobody is willing to buy it—is very expensive. “But in community facilities 
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loans, if you look around, there’s no comparable data anywhere,” according to Donovan. 
“And the issue that Nancy brought up is that we have a track record, but somehow it doesn’t 
seem to be enough volume to reach the hurdles, the kind of statistical hurdles we have to over-
come. So, I wonder if anybody has any perspective on that and how to get over that hurdle?”
The key to better pricing is better data; that will enable the industry to turn uncertain 
investments into investments with known risks. [See the article by Mary Tingerthal on this 
theme later in the Review.]
Altman suggested that the process of securitization itself can be part of the solution. 
“When you securitize, what happens is that the obliqueness or the opaqueness of a process 
in a local community economic development organization suddenly becomes transparent 
because many pairs of eyes are looking at those loans.”
Another by-product of securitization that might solve the data problem over time is the 
coordination of loan servicing. Such a coordination would create multiple benefits by saving 
money with good and efficient servicing systems that also collect data. David Sand from 
Access Capital focused the group’s discussion on the need for servicing. “In my dream world 
there would be some industry-recognized master servicer who would have sub-servicing 
relationships.”
If existing data are too limited to be useful, one alternative is to find proxy variables that 
can tell the story to investors how an asset will perform over time. Mary Tingerthal said, “We 
think that we’re on the verge of that with some of the work that S&P [Standard and Poor’s] 
has done in the small business lending category. I’d like to talk about where the other oppor-
tunities are, where there’s been enough activity, where there’s enough of a track record to be 
able to find proxies and put those together with the experience, and really begin to turn them 
into risk equations that can then be evaluated.”
Making a Market
It is hard to imagine an entity big enough to make the secondary market in community 
development loans happen. Even if investors could be brought on board and they could 
price the assets based on elegant models with sufficient data, it is still not clear how we could 
coordinate the infrastructure that is necessary to make this market work. Greg Stanton, of 
Wall Street Without Walls, emphasized this point when he said that you have to build the 
infrastructure: “It has everything to do with a systematic organization of originators working 
through defined aggregators that are able to sell to ‘buy-and-hold’ investors”:
The major issue for these folks is putting the data collection on common 
ground required by grantors and foundations, one document, one law firm, 
one approach, and be able to set up the system devoid of egos with originators 
selling into the aggregators and selling off to the street. The street will then not 
be just an institutional investor, but will be an institutional investor that has a 
defined 10-, 20-, 25-year liability requirement that they need to match, and the 
CDFI industry can build a product for that.
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Getting agreement on industry standards from a group of unrelated and often competi-
tive organizations is no mean feat. In what some have called the “check your guns at the 
door” school of thought, Catherine Dolan of Wachovia Bank suggested, “Why don’t we get 
a core group of us that represents the funding side, the origination side, the credit enhance-
ment side, and we all play various roles in each of the sectors, and just focus on two or three 
ways of going about this. And let’s agree to put the competitive issues and the egos, as best 
we can, aside and all agree to create some scale.” [See Catherine Dolan’s article on this idea 
later in this Review.]
There are many examples where borrowers who traditionally went to banks and other 
depository institutions for capital got fed up with that approach and went around them. Van 
Order suggested that the junk bond market might be a good analogy. “It doesn’t have a good 
name, but the junk bond market developed in the 1980s because Michael Milken and others 
discovered that low-credit borrowers were stuck going to banks. He also discovered that a 
diversified portfolio of these high-risk loans looked better than you might think, and it was 
an alternative market.”
Public Policy
Public policy solutions might help the industry evolve toward a model that relies more 
on capital markets than depository institutions and foundations. As the institutions grow, 
they may develop a louder voice on Capitol Hill. As Andrews suggested, “I can imagine 
the policy clout that we could have if we leverage not only the vision of our organizations 
but also our track record and our scale, and we market this or describe this in the halls of 
Congress in an organized fashion.” 
On specific policy solutions, such as technical assistance for CDFIs that would like to 
enhance their technical skills and capacity, Linda Davenport of the CDFI Fund said, “We do 
have a limited amount of funds, but it seems that with both technical-assistance and finan-
cial-assistance programs, there ought to be a way for people to competitively apply to the 
Fund for some amount of funding that would help bring together that strategic partnership 
that Nancy was talking about or standardized documentation.”
Networks
Another theme that wove its way through many of the conversations at the conference 
was about how an organization might increase its capacity. There was discussion, too, about 
how multiple organizations, playing specialized roles in a transaction, could grow their 
capacity together. Many conferees referred to this as a network approach to achieving scale 
for the community development industry. As Altman said, “Our biggest problem, in my 
view, is getting the whole industry to scale to achieve specialization or differentiation so that 
we view ourselves as a network that works together with highly specialized organizations 
that can originate, can service, can securitize. Then we build on that network and on the 
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specialization that these different entities have to create something that is bigger and better 
than what we have if we’re each operating individually.” Growing as a network confers many 
benefits, according to Altman: 
In other words, the more people who play in the game, the better it is for every-
body. And the secondary market effort is still incredibly small compared to the 
marketplace of community development, financial institutions, and others that 
originate and create loans in low-income communities. So the more who can 
play, the better, and we need to find ways of doing that. 
Getting to scale is related to that because the more who can play means that 
they need to be doing that at some scale so that efficiencies are created in the 
marketplace. We are just ecstatic about doing a $55 million securitization of 
business loans, but that is way too small to be efficient. 
To a large extent, that means finding out how we can scale up in a networked 
fashion rather than building vertical organizations because I don’t think that’s 
ever going to happen in our industry. So I want to play on what others brought 
up about finding areas of specialized expertise that we have already in the 
network, in the system, and then finding ways of organizing or enhancing those 
so that they can be a resource for the industry, whether it be LIIF in its capacity 
with child-care loans or New Hampshire’s ability to make mobile-home loans. 
We don’t have to keep replicating the wheel because right now we work in an 
industry that is highly fractionated and has very high transaction costs. Some 
of them are necessary because of the nature of our borrowers, but many of 
them are there because of the low scale of our operations. We need to find 
ways of applying technology and systems across the industry that will allow the 
industry to become more efficient because then we’ll need less subsidy.
Thomas Bledsoe’s Housing Partnership Network is already experimenting with network 
approaches to solving the scale and efficiency problems. “The strength that our organizations 
have is that they are local, so they’re connected to their markets. They know risk very well 
and they have excellent information”:
The key part of the model is being able to go to capital markets with enough 
scale and having the performance data to be able to back that up, and then 
create a structure that allows you to control the economics. If the organizations 
are managing the risk—and in the case of insurance it’s our members who are 
doing property management, they’re doing residence services, all of the things 
that mitigate risk—they are controlling the hot buttons on these deals, and 
so we’re aligning their kind of risk management with financial returns based 
on how well the company does. So that company, the Housing Partnership 
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Insurance, is in its third year; it’s done very well, it’s been quite profitable. 
We’ve had funding from a lot of organizations around this table, including, 
actually, the U.S. Congress, and from that we realize that we can play a role in 
helping our larger members collaborate in accessing capital markets based on 
demonstrated performance.
We’re looking at the possibility of using that structure and maybe using some 
of the same capabilities for single-family sub-prime loans, charter schools, and 
small rental properties. 
Creating further specialization might fundamentally alter the roles of CDFIs. As Nancy 
Andrews explains:
We will begin selling our intellectual capital much more than we’re selling our 
subsidized capital. It’s our know-how that’s important, not our money. 
We’ll very likely use other people’s money much, much more than our own, 
whether it’s a secondary market approach, securitization, asset sales, whatever, 
but we will very much be in the partnership business of trying to figure out a 
way of using the money that others have.
In addition to the advantages of specialization, larger networks can hook up into the 
massive structures of the capital markets. Working in isolation, no one CDFI could integrate 
into that system; working as a network, however, might bring the scale that is necessary to 
work toe to toe with world capital markets. Altman said:
The scale at which the [capital markets] have to operate is such that to get 
down to the retail level is impossible. So, the only way we can tap that capital 
to the extent that that capital is something we think is appropriate is to build 
an institutional framework or an institutional system with the scale that can 
actually talk to that institution. And a secondary market can do that. So, I 
think a large part of the issue we’re facing in the industry is trying to build the 
network of highly specialized institutions and nodes throughout the country, 
some of which are able to originate and understand the borrower very well. 
[Others], such as mortgage insurers, can add a kind of good housekeeping seal 
of approval to a loan or can help to take some of the risk and build the rich 
credit-enhancement requirements that are necessary so that the marketplace 
can become more liquid. And then, to be able to build to a scale where it is 
possible to issue securities that are much more like what’s being issued in the 
capital markets and are rated. 
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Dan Letendre vouched for the fact that the investor interest is there for large-volume 
investments,  but  the  community  development  community  is  not  yet  ready  to  provide 
volume product. He explained how the structured finance side of his operation wanted to 
add some community development loans to its pool: 
They were very excited about the news, said “absolutely great.” And I quote: 
“I only need $180 million to top off my pool and I can give you until the end 
of the month [to deliver the product].” I explained that this probably wasn’t 
going to work for my client set and that while my CDFI clients were very 
thirsty for the product and the capacity, this was like drinking from a fire hose. 
Mainstream investors’ appetite and the form of it is not exactly in line with 
what CDFIs and loan funds can yet provide. I do think, however, that CRA-
motivated investors and socially motivated investors are at the place—maybe 
not mainstream investors yet—but CRA investors are at the place where they 
are already interested, willing, and quite active as investors in the secondary 
market for community development loans and asset securitization. 
So how does the community development industry get there from here? Bob Schall from 
Self-Help warns against waiting for epiphanies. “I don’t think there will be an ‘aha’ moment 
when CD loans are instantly securitizable,” he said. “However, what we can do is select 
certain assets that are more likely to be securitized and change our lending practices to make 
the assets more homogeneous.”
In this effort, Greg Stanton counseled to “start off in the areas that require the least 
amount of subsidy to make it happen, show them as examples, and then work in, as opposed 
to doing the hardest to do.”
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